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Iraq’s ability to reach its energy potential should be of broad regional and international concern. 
Iraq could be poised for a dramatic transformation, one in which it finally escapes the political 
and technical constraints that have kept it producing less than 4 percent of the world’s oil, despite 
having the third-largest conventional oil reserves in the world. Should Iraq meet its ambitions to 
bring nearly 10 million more barrels of oil on line by 2017, it would constitute the largest ever 
capacity increase in the history of the oil industry. Should Iraq, more probably, bring only half 
this capacity to market, it would still represent a massive achievement.
1
 
 
Translating Iraq’s energy promise into reality is in the shared interest of Iraq, the United States, 
Japan, and the international community more broadly. At the highest level, the health of Iraq’s 
energy sector—currently the source of more than 90 percent of revenues accrued by the state—is 
a major determinant in setting Iraq’s overall trajectory. A booming energy economy is not a 
guarantee of a prosperous, democratic, and stable Iraq; it could also be the hallmark of an Iraq 
that has returned to authoritarianism or even tyranny. But it is difficult to imagine a prosperous, 
democratic, and stable Iraq that does not claim a thriving energy industry among its assets.  
 
More specifically, from an Iraqi perspective, developing and monetizing Iraq’s underground 
wealth is the cornerstone of a successful development strategy. After more than 30 years of 
internal conflict, international war, sanctions, and dictatorship, Iraq’s development needs are 
enormous. Reclaiming Iraq’s position as one of the more advanced economies and societies of 
the region will require huge investments in infrastructure, health, and education. The 
government’s ability to successfully make these investments is the key to the consolidation of the 
new political system Iraq has created since the fall of Saddam Hussein. A failure to deliver across 
social and economic dimensions will—and has begun to—put Iraq’s fragile democracy under 
enormous strain. In addition, Iraqis are cognizant that their energy strategy is also their foreign 
policy strategy and their security strategy. Not only are high revenues needed to build and 
maintain a military capable of meeting Iraq’s internal and external threats, but Baghdad’s 
capacity to re-establish itself as a regional power will be in part a measure of its ability to 
maintain influence with and over its neighbors on account of their energy links to Iraq. 
 
The United States, Japan, and the international community share most of these interests with 
Iraq, if bringing a slightly different perspective to the situation. This group is invested in Iraqi 
stability and the consolidation of Iraq’s nascent democracy not only for the benefits it brings to 
the Iraqi people, but also because it is the foundation of Iraq’s relationships in the international 
arena. Iraq’s internal institutions will in large part determine Iraq’s external orientation. 
Particularly now that staunch American allies in the Middle East—such as Hosni Mubarak’s 
                                                 
1 See Bernstein Research, The Herculean Challenge of Lifting Iraq’s Oil Production, August 3, 2010, p. 2.  
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Egypt and Ben Ali’s Tunisia—are gone, the United States should value governments likely to be 
sympathetic to its needs and interests in the region more broadly. Although today’s Iraq is 
neither inclined nor able to carry American water in the region at this time, it is certainly more 
likely to be in broad alignment with the United States in the future than any resurgent 
authoritarian regime in Baghdad would be.  
 
Similarly, Iraq’s stability has major implications for regional stability. Literally sitting on the 
seams of the Middle East, Iraq embraces nearly every fault line of the region. Its ethnic, sectarian, 
linguistic, and religious diversity—in combination with its natural resources, robust population, 
and sheer size—has led every regional power to see its interests as caught up in Iraq’s destiny and 
has justified a wide variety of external interventions by Iraq’s neighbors. A fractious Iraq, with 
uncertain politics and fragile institutions, will instigate more instability throughout the region. 
While this connection between Iraq and the region is well understood, what may be less 
appreciated is Iraq’s ability to stabilize the region. As revolutions unseat longstanding dictators, 
few have had time to consider what economic model will alleviate the economic deprivation and 
frustration that drove many of the recent protests. Unlikely to compete with China’s ability to 
serve as the factory of the world, Middle Eastern nations will need to seek greater economic gains 
through regional integration. Iraq, given its geographic location, its historical role as a regional 
leader, and its energy wealth, could be a prime driver of such integration—if it can realize the 
potential of its oil and gas deposits. 
 
Finally, the international community—particularly large energy consuming countries like the 
United States, China and Japan—has a major interest in Iraq reaching its energy potential 
because of the implications of Iraq’s success or failure in this realm for energy security. The 
global recession and accompanying decrease in demand for energy in 2009 and much of 2010 
removed concerns over limited spare oil capacity from the forefront of many minds. The new 
turbulence in the Middle East and the resumption of global energy demand at the end of 2010, 
however, should remind us that the current spare capacity in the global system is finite. Decisions 
to further expand capacity have largely been put on hold as producing countries seek to gauge 
the trajectory of international demand; talk of a “demand peak” due to concerns over climate and 
the environment as well as economic uncertainties have made countries such as Saudi Arabia 
reluctant to build more spare capacity.  
 
As a result, the international community is very likely to be reliant on Iraq (and Saudi Arabia) to 
bring more oil to international markets in the coming years if the world is to avert another 
supply crunch like that which occurred in 2008. The severity and timing of such a crisis is 
dependent on a wide variety of factors, such as the growth of Chinese demand and whether Iran 
remains subject to international sanctions over the long term. But the projections of many 
companies and international agencies include Iraq bringing substantial quantities of oil to 
international markets in the coming years. The International Energy Agency envisions Iraq  
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bringing on line an additional 3.6 million barrels a day (b/d) of oil to what it currently produces; 
BP similarly sees Iraq producing 5.5 million b/d in total by 2030.
2
 
 The inability of Iraq to bring 
these significant quantities of oil on line in the coming years diminishes the prospect of the world 
meeting global energy demand at a reasonable price and increases the possibility of another 
global economic crisis. 
II. Factors Complicating Iraq’s Energy Ascendance 
 
Given the high stakes surrounding Iraq’s ability to realize its energy potential, it is no surprise 
that obstacles to the development of Iraq’s energy sector have received substantial attention. The 
broad conversation surrounding risks to Iraq’s energy plans, however, have largely focused on 
operational and logistical factors. In particular, industry experts and planners lament the huge 
bottlenecks associated with Iraq’s decrepit infrastructure. The dire state of Iraq’s energy 
infrastructure—and corresponding need for international investment—was even the focus of a 
recent speech by Ambassador Richard Morningstar, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s special 
envoy for Eurasian energy.
3  Iraq’s deficit in human capacity, particularly professionals who are 
able to manage projects and make decisions within the energy related ministries, is also often 
decried. The limited number of high-level technocrats, combined with the fear of being 
prosecuted for corruption, has created serious frustrations among international oil companies 
(IOCs) needing quick decisions. Finally, legitimate concerns persist about the security 
environment in which much of the development of Iraq’s energy resources will take place. 
Although the country has made huge strides in improving security since the dark days of 2006-
2007, the security environment in many parts of the country remains difficult. While Iraqi and 
international companies have been able to do business, recent attacks on infrastructure in 
particular demonstrate the continued difficulty of developing Iraq’s energy sector.
4
 
 
While these operational and logistical factors will play a large role in whether Iraq reaches its 
energy potential, political factors will be equally important. These political matters have received 
less systematic attention than other factors, perhaps because they are harder to visualize, 
understand, or resolve through the commitment of more financial resources or sheer hard work. 
Nevertheless, the resolution or management of several political issues is essential to the smooth 
development of Iraq’s energy. The remainder of this paper considers five such factors, explaining 
the nature of the current political challenge, its implications for energy, and its prospects for 
resolution. 
                                                 
2 See International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook, 2010 and BP, BP Energy Outlook, January 2011. 
3 Ambassador Richard Morningstar, Remarks delivered at CERA Week 2011, Houston, Texas, 7 March 2011.  
4 There has been a notable uptick in attacks on energy-related installations in the first half of 2011. Some believe 
that Al Qaeda has an explicit strategy of attacking energy infrastructure as a way of destabilizing Iraq. Insurgents 
waged a critical attack on the Beiji oil refinery in February 2011 and again in June 2011; subsequent attacks have 
focused on smaller installations, but all with the intention of creating major disruptions to the flow of resources and 
the ability of the Iraqi government to collect revenue.  
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Political Stability  
The single most important political factor for Iraq’s energy development is political stability, not 
just of the current government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, but of the current post-
Saddam system. Like other countries in the Middle East, Iraq has experienced a number of public 
protests in 2011. But unlike in Egypt, Tunisia, or Libya, such protests have not sought to change 
the nature of the regime, or even remove the current individuals from power. Instead, these 
protests have focused on the socioeconomic conditions that many Iraqis endure and have 
provided a vehicle for expressing desires for greater freedom and accountability of the 
government. It is no small matter that most Iraqis are now committed to a democratic system; 
unlike in years past, calls rejecting Iraq’s new institutions are no longer often heard. But nearly 
eight years after the removal of Saddam, Iraqis are still facing high levels of unemployment and 
minimal provision of social services from the state. The most common concern is the lack of 
electricity. Demand for electricity has more than doubled since 2003 while supply increases have 
been more modest, leading to a persistent gap between supply and demand. Protests over the 
paucity of power fueled angry protests in Basra and Nasiriya as early as a year ago and led to the 
resignation of the Minister of Electricity in summer 2010.  
 
The Maliki government, watching events in the region closely, has thus far reacted to the protests 
of 2011 through a number of initiatives. The prime minister has suggested he will not seek to 
become prime minister again after his current term concludes. He has also returned half of his 
salary to the national budget. The government has taken steps aimed specifically at easing short- 
term hardships, including pledging to provide free fuel to both private and government 
generators with the understanding that the operators will supply electricity to the grid at reduced 
prices.
5  The deputy prime minister for energy, former oil minister Hussain Shahristani, declared 
free electricity for Iraq’s poorest and the government as a whole has shifted some of its spending 
priorities within the current budget to try to meet popular demands more quickly.
6  In June 2011, 
the Iraqi cabinet approved $927 million in supplementary funds for “strategic projects” for 
electricity generation.
7
 
  Despite these efforts to be responsive to the street, public protests led to 
the resignation of two of Iraq’s provincial governors during the first half of 2011. 
The result of this wave—albeit small by regional standards—of public pressure on Iraq’s 
government is not yet clear. It is possible that pressure from the populace could spur the 
members of the Maliki government to pull together to focus on delivery of services to Iraqis in a 
way that previous security conditions and political rivalries made nearly impossible. The need to 
respond to an increasingly restive and vocal population helps explain several recent 
                                                 
5 Ben Van Heuvelen, “Heading Off Summer Power Protests,” Iraq Oil Report, May 27, 2011. 
6 Iraq has reportedly suspended the purchase of fighter jets in order to allocate more resources to the food basket 
distributed to Iraqi citizens.  
7 Middle East Economic Survey, “Iraq Approves $927mn Additional Budget for Power Projects,” June 19. 2011.   
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developments: the decision to sign an agreement for a pipeline to bring gas to Baghdad from 
Iran, the creation of a “master plan” for electricity, and the apparent resolution of the three-year 
old stalemate between the Iraqi government and Shell over the development of Basra gas.
8
 
 A 
pulling together effect would be beneficial for the industry, as it would add impetus to nascent 
efforts to look at Iraq’s energy sector as a whole and develop a strategic, integrated plan for it. 
In reality, popular pressure on the Maliki government is more likely to be deleterious to energy 
developments than it is to be beneficial. Such pressures could lead the prime minister to further 
consolidate power, which could further galvanize popular and—importantly—political elite 
opposition to the prime minister.
9  The implications for energy sector development could be far-
reaching. Increased political strain within the government will reinforce existing tendencies 
toward short-term thinking.
10
 
  Iraq should be deciding its stance on strategic questions—such as 
whether its goal is to maximize revenues or production or whether it wishes to develop and hold 
spare capacity—and formulating its plans in light of its answers. Instead, the energy sector of the 
country is still driven more by a sense of political urgency and has not yet internalized the idea of 
opportunity costs. The result is that Iraq is falling short of the achievements it is capable of 
realizing and it may be setting itself up for failure or crisis further down the road. For instance, if 
Iraq—in its focus on boosting oil production—brings so much oil to market that there is a price 
collapse, the country could end up with fewer revenues than it earns today, despite producing 
more oil. 
More extreme political scenarios are possible, but much less likely. Political opposition to 
Maliki—on the streets and within his own government—could conceivably lead to his ouster as 
prime minister. Although the removal of a prime minister can be achieved by a simple majority 
vote in Parliament, the more difficult process of forming a new government has been an effective 
                                                 
8 On July 13, 2011, the Iraqi government and Shell initialed a gas deal that had been languishing since 2008. The 
deal, which gives Shell and its joint venture partners the right to handle all associated gas from the large Basra 
fields, ran into repeated delays for multiple political, legal, and technical reasons. The first, and most prominent, is 
the sole-source nature of the deal. Unlike the contracts awarded through the bid rounds, the Shell deal happened 
through bilateral channels with little transparency. Second, the deal was under intense scrutiny because its focus 
appeared to be on exporting Iraqi gas, at a time when Iraq is dramatically short of electricity and, many argue, 
should be focused on provision of services to Iraqis. A Shell official, in commenting on the July breakthrough, 
suggested an arrangement in which domestic needs would be met before export. Another reason for the delays was 
that the landscape changed significantly in Basra since the Shell agreement was envisioned; IOCs now are 
responsible for increasing production in these fields and may well wish to use the associated gas for their own uses. 
Finally, a raft of legal issues dogged the contract, including a law demanding that all exports flow through the State 
Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO). 
9 As of mid-July 2011, Prime Minister Maliki had still not appointed ministers to the security portfolios, but was 
maintaining these files himself. The government has reacted to protests with force in some cases and has exerted 
political pressure on parties supporting those protesting. Most recently, the prime minister has sought to gain control 
over formerly independent commissions. See New York Times, “Mr. Maliki’s Power Grab,” March 13, 2011, for 
commentary. 
10 For instance, Iraq will move away from efforts to charge for electricity and will divert limited electricity supply 
from productive sectors to residential ones.   
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break on this action in the past. Theoretically, Iraq’s protests could result in a breakdown of the 
system and collapse of the country’s institutions and subsequent lapse into civil disorder; this 
scenario is very much at the margins. In terms of the implications of these more extreme 
scenarios, the removal of the current prime minister would undoubtedly slow down decision-
making, suspend any future bid rounds, and open a wider door to opposition to the existing 
contracts. It would not, however, likely signal the end of Iraq’s efforts to ramp up production and 
export of oil and gas. The most extreme and very unlikely scenario of civil chaos, in contrast, 
could be consistent with a suspension of current operations and a return to energy stagnation 
depending on the scope and depth of unrest. 
 
Power Sharing Arrangements in Baghdad 
Even if we assume that the wave of popular mobilization sweeping the Arab world, and touching 
Iraq, has no appreciable effect on political stability, the nature of the current government in Iraq 
is an important factor in understanding the prospects for Iraq’s rapid energy development. After 
nine months of painful political stalemate following the March 2010 parliamentary elections, Iraq 
formed a government at the end of last year. The stalemate—and to a great extent the face and 
form of the government—was the product of a very close election. Former prime minister Ayad 
Allawi’s Iraqiya coalition, an alliance of cross-sectarian nationalists and Sunni-based parties, won 
the most seats in Parliament. The party of the incumbent prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, was a 
close runner-up with only two seats less. Jockeying over the meaning of certain constitutional 
provisions concerning government formation and incessant politicking between possible 
coalition partners finally ended with the formation of a government of national unity. All parties 
winning any sizable number of seats were awarded ministerial or other prominent posts 
according to an elaborate formula and pre-government formation deals. Ayad Allawi, although 
ceding to Maliki in the competition to be prime minister, was promised an influential position as 
the head of a new executive body with a broad mandate over strategic issues. 
 
As has happened on each occasion in Iraq’s post-Saddam era, the need for inclusion won out 
over the need for effectiveness. Had Maliki formed a government without the cooperation of 
Iraqiya, the overall stability of the government would have been at risk. Iraqiya felt that it had 
“won” the election; to exclude it from government would have alienated the Sunnis who 
supported the coalition in large numbers, possibly reversing years of effort to bring Sunnis into 
the political process. The result, however justified, is a cabinet that has internalized all of Iraq’s 
political differences. The cabinet has more than 40 members, many of whom are themselves 
heads of political parties.
11
                                                 
11 Prime Minister Maliki has recently called for downsizing his cabinet, although doing so will be difficult given 
existing political arrangements.  
  In Iraq’s highly party-centric polity, these ministers may feel 
empowered to resist Prime Minister Maliki’s directions and pursue contrary agendas. There are 
also three deputy prime ministers, including one for energy matters. The creation of this  
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position, and its assumption by former oil minister Hussain Shahristani, may create confusion as 
to who is in charge of decision-making related to oil.  
 
Perhaps the most problematic power-sharing arrangement, from the perspective of the smooth 
functioning of the energy sector, would be the creation of the National Council for Strategic 
Policies (NCSP). This entity was envisioned and promised as a means of creating an influential 
and sufficiently attractive post for Ayad Allawi so he would relinquish claims to the premier post 
in the wake of the close election. The NCSP was conceived to be an extra-constitutional body that 
is comprised of the leaders of every political party in Parliament. Parliament is to pass legislation 
mapping out the mandate of the body and the mechanisms by which it functions. Political 
agreements sealed before government formation anticipated authority over a broad range of 
policy matters, including the energy sector. Although the threshold for binding decisions is 
expected to be high at 80 percent, this body was conceived to have true executive authority. 
 
The potentially complicated implications of the not-yet-formed NCSP for energy development 
are evident. The 80 percent threshold would make it unlikely that the programs of the prime 
minister would be overturned by the NSCP, but that is not an impossible outcome. Exactly what 
the role of the NCSP would be in the signing and execution of oil contracts is unclear, but the 
body would almost surely want to give contracts its imprimatur. The NCSP would certainly 
expect to have the ability to shape and approve any broad strategy for the sector, which could 
result in mixed signals, poor decision-making, and paralysis.  
 
Partially due to the difficulties of what is effectively splitting executive authority between the 
cabinet and an extra-judicial body, efforts to translate political agreements about the NSCP into 
political reality have stalled. In March 2011, Ayad Allawi publicly announced that he would no 
longer head the body even if it were to be established; subsequent negotiations continued in the 
hope that he could be convinced otherwise.
12  Given these developments, the NSCP may never be 
established or, if it is, it could be a much-emasculated version of the original concept. The 
ignominious failure to establish this body—which was such a key component of the final deal to 
form the government—bodes badly for the current government’s ability to maintain broad 
political support.
13
 
  It, however, would likely keep Iraq’s energy plans from suffering from yet 
another layer of complexity.  
 
 
                                                 
12 See New York Times, “Iraqi Coalition Leader Balks at Post, Dealing Government a Blow,” March 3, 2011. 
13 The impact of the collapse of this component of the agreement, however, will be less than originally anticipated. 
Although Allawi’s alienation from the government is a serious loss, it will not precipitate a withdrawal of Iraqiyah 
from the government as whole. Too many members of Iraqiyah have already established themselves in high places 
and the coalition has begun to fracture and lose force as a political entity.   
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Resource Nationalism and Contract Sanctity 
The decision to invite IOCs into Iraq to help the country develop its energy resources was a 
difficult and hotly contested one. The government of Iraq nationalized its oil industry in 1972 
and, despite the negotiation of production-sharing agreements in the 1990s pending the lifting of 
United Nations (U.N.) sanctions, no IOCs had done business in Iraq since that time. In the wake 
of the American-led occupation, Iraqis debated whether they really needed international help to 
increase the levels of oil production, or whether they had sufficient capacity, technology, and 
resources to do it on their own. Failure to agree to a new oil law governing investment in Iraq’s 
energy sector added to the stasis and it was not until 2009 that Iraq offered its first bid round for 
the development of some of its largest producing fields. 
 
Given the inability to agree on new legislation (see next section), the three bid rounds that were 
conducted in 2009 and 2010 were done under an Iraqi law dating back to 1967.
14
 
  This law, while 
not precluding production-sharing agreements, is read by many as requiring Iraq’s parliamentary 
body to approve of all upstream contracts. This requirement was of little consequence when 
Iraq’s Parliament was a rubber stamp body for Saddam’s decisions. In the post-Saddam Iraq, 
however, Parliament has real authority and much greater autonomy from the executive, making 
the prospect of a parliamentary rejection of such sensitive contracts real. While some anticipated 
that IOCs would be reluctant to invest billions of dollars with such uncertainty around the oil 
law, the results of the bid rounds suggested otherwise.  
The earlier government, also led by Prime Minister Maliki, handled the issue of contract 
approval deftly, arguing that approval by the cabinet was sufficient for the finalization of the 
contracts. This approach, in conjunction with the excellent terms perceived to have been 
negotiated by Iraq, the technical service nature of the contracts, and the transparency of the bid 
rounds, largely quelled any real opposition of Parliament; the bid rounds, and the execution of 
the contracts that resulted, continued apace. The one sustained challenge to the legitimacy of 
these contracts, championed by former parliamentarian Shetha Musawi, died in court on a 
technicality.  
 
The pressing question for today is whether the relatively new Parliament—or any members of the 
new government—will challenge the legitimacy of the contracts or  their specific terms. In 
considering this issue, one should note that the overwhelming majority of Iraq’s members of 
Parliament today are new to office; the anti-incumbency vote swept away most of the sitting 
parliamentarians in the March 2010 election. In addition, one should note the statements made 
by politicians and parties in the run-up to the election. Iraqiya, the party of Ayad Allawi, made 
known its view that all  existing contracts—within Iraq as a whole and those signed by the 
                                                 
14 Iraq’s constitution says that existing laws maintain their legality unless specifically revoked or superseded by new 
legislation.   
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Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)—required review by Parliament and possible re-
negotiation.
15 Moqtada al-Sadr, the radical anti-American leader of the Sadrist movement, took 
an even stronger stance, arguing against involvement of IOCs in Iraq’s oil industry on the 
grounds of nationalism.
16
 
 
The formation of a national unity government, however, has diminished the chances of a frontal 
assault by political parties on the existing oil contracts for a number of reasons. Most 
importantly, the coalitions and parties most vocally critical of the contracts—Iraqiya and the 
Sadrists—are now part of the sitting government. Even if Ayad Allawi distances himself from the 
government as discussed above, it would be difficult for him to bring his coalition out of 
government as an entire bloc, as many from Iraqiyah are already in positions of power and 
influence and would be reluctant to relinquish these roles.
17
 
 The prospect of a robust, Iraqiyah-
centric opposition that might take up the issue of the legitimacy of oil contracts is therefore 
minimal. The Sadrists are also now inside the political tent, holding the positions of deputy 
speaker of Parliament as well as several ministries; they are now also invested in the success of the 
government. In short, one virtue of the broadly inclusive government described above is that few 
players have any incentive to take steps that would inevitably result in depriving the government 
of much-needed resources about to come on line. Iraq’s recently concluded 2011 budget plans for 
$83 billion of expenditures; meeting the needs envisioned in the budget will require robust oil 
exports. 
While the political parties may be less likely to champion wholesale revisions of the existing 
contracts, Parliament is exerting its prerogatives and seeking to challenge the government’s 
ability to continue to develop the oil sector without its involvement. Adnan al-Janabi, the 
chairman of the Oil and Gas Committee of Iraq’s Parliament, has clearly expressed his view that 
all contracts—in the Kurdistan Regional Government as well as the south—need to be reviewed 
because they were completed in the absence of binding legislation governing the development of 
the energy sector. In July 2011, the committee submitted a motion to Parliament seeking a vote 
that would call for a moratorium on the signing of any new oil or gas contracts until new 
hydrocarbons legislation is passed. The initiative is more intended to add urgency to the on-
going effort to resolve national differences about such legislation than it is an effort to stop 
foreign companies from entering Iraq. The committee has breathed new life into other, related 
                                                 
15 See Iraqiya statement in October 2010 on the gas bid round which claimed, "These actions are also considered 
illegal in light of the current constitutional and political vacuum engulfing the country."  Reuters, “Iraq's Sunni-
backed Political Bloc Rejects Gas Auction,” October 24, 2010. Maysoon al-Damluji, an Iraqiya member and key 
adviser to Iraqiya leader Ayad Allawi, claims all contracts need to be reviewed in Ben Lando, “Iraqiya Against Gas 
and Oil Deals,” Iraq Oil Report (online at www.iraqoilreport.com), October 26, 2010. 
16  In response to a query from a follower, Moqtada al-Sadr recently forbade his followers from working for an 
unnamed British drilling company. No stance was taken on non-British companies. See Ben Van Heuvelen, “Luaibi 
to head Oil Ministry, Shahristani to DPM,” Iraq Oil Report (online at www.iraqoilreport.com), December 21, 2010. 
17 For instance, the speaker of parliament, Osama Najafi, is from Iraqiyah, as is one deputy prime minister and the 
ministers of finance, agriculture, education, communications, and science and technology.  
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debates as well. Most notably, the committee held July 2011 hearings on whether Iraq should re-
establish an Iraqi National Oil Committee.
18  While those who testified presented a range of 
conflicting views, the hearing added momentum to recent efforts to resolve long-standing 
roadblocks in Iraq’s energy sector (see below).
19
 
 
Even without a Parliament-induced examination of the existing contracts, some will be revised in 
the months and years ahead. Questions around the structure of the contracts are becoming more 
frequent, even among those in government, as the Iraqis realize that the contracts provide huge 
incentives to companies to ramp up production quickly to begin cost recovery, perhaps to the 
long-term detriment to the fields.
20
 
 Other impetuses to marginal renegotiations down the line 
could be the need to handle shut-in production due to Iraq’s adherence to an OPEC quota, or the 
mutual desire on the part of the government and the IOCs to shift responsibility for 
infrastructure development. 
Federalism and Constitutional Issues 
The most fundamental disagreement in Iraq today relates to the nature of the state: should Iraq 
be a federal country or a more centralized one as it has been throughout history?  Iraq’s 
constitution explicitly declares Iraq a federal state, recognizes the status of the Kurdistan 
Regional Government and its authority over a broad range of matters, delineates the rights of 
current provinces to become “regions” with their corresponding powers, and even declares 
regional laws as superior to federal ones. Despite these strong statements in support of Iraq as a 
federal state, the matter has continued to be debated, with many Arab leaders declaring their 
opposition to federalism beyond the Iraqi Kurdistan. Like many traditional Arab states, the 
commitment to a strong central government runs deep among many Iraqis, some of which see 
federalism as a precursor to the breakup of the state. In contrast, Kurdish leaders see their ability 
to maintain a semi-autonomous region as a precondition to their union with Iraq; few issues 
carry more emotional weight in Kurdistan. This debate, however, is dynamic and has taken some 
interesting turns in the recent year, particularly as parts of Iraq become increasingly frustrated 
with the ability of Baghdad to provide basic services.  
 
The Iraqi ambivalence toward federalism is reflected in the country’s constitution. In many 
places, the constitution stipulates that certain matters—such as the exact shape of a second 
chamber of Parliament allegedly to represent regional interests—will be clarified in legislation to 
                                                 
18 The Iraq National Oil Company was established in 1967, but then disbanded by Saddam in 1987. 
19 For details on the hearing, see Ben Lando, “Oil Experts Debate a New State Oil Company,” Iraq Oil Report, July 
7, 2011. 
20 Interview with Thamer al-Ghadban, currently chairman of the advisory commission in the office of Iraqi Prime 
Minister Maliki and Maliki’s top energy adviser. He was formerly Iraq’s oil minister. For explanation of cost 
recovery mechanisms and the incentives created, see Deutsche Bank, Iraq: The Mother of All Oil Stories, Global 
Markets Research, October 4, 2010, pp. 16-18 and Muhammed Mazeel al-Aboudi, “Iraq’s TSC and PSC 
Agreements – A Good Deal for Iraq?” Middle East Economic Survey LII, no. 3 (January 18, 2010).  
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be passed by the Parliament. In other places, particularly those relating to oil and gas, the 
constitution is intentionally ambiguous; the ability of both Kurds and Arabs to read what they 
wanted to into certain provisions was key to the passage of the constitution when it needed to 
hurdle a referendum in 2005.  
 
These complex issues related to federalism and the constitution have had profound effects on the 
development of Iraq’s oil and gas industry to date. Their resolution—or festering—will 
undoubtedly have major implications for the future of Iraqi energy. Two broad sets of related 
issues warrant further examination:  tensions between Baghdad and the KRG over the 
development of energy and growing impulses toward provincial empowerment or federalism in 
Arab provinces. 
 
Since the completion of the constitution, leaders from the federal government in Baghdad and 
the KRG have sought to resolve their differences over how energy should be developed in the 
country. The disagreements—although multiple and varied—stem from this fundamental 
divergence of opinion over whether power should reside primarily in Baghdad, or in the regions. 
Two issues in particular have festered related to oil and gas. First, Baghdad and the KRG disagree 
over which entity has the right to develop the resources in the region (i.e., the KRG). The 
constitution includes vague language on this matter, suggesting that Baghdad will have primary 
authority over “existing” fields. “New fields,” the Kurds claim, therefore fall into the purview of 
the regions and can be developed according to Kurdish decisions without input or approval from 
Baghdad. Second, Baghdad and the Kurds have differed over what are appropriate contracting 
mechanisms for the development of Iraq’s resources. Baghdad has stuck to technical service 
agreements, while the KRG has awarded lucrative production-sharing agreements to IOCs. Other 
related matters are additional irritants in the relationship, including exactly how the budget is 
handled and national oil revenues are divided.  
Tensions between Baghdad and the Kurdish Regional Government 
 
Attempts at reconciling these views or creating acceptable compromises essentially ground to a 
halt in 2007; the cabinet approved draft oil and gas legislation, but the Parliament failed to do the 
same. In the absence of an agreement, the KRG passed its own oil and gas legislation and 
proceeded to award dozens of production-sharing agreements to IOCs for exploration within its 
boundaries. Baghdad declared such contracts to be “unconstitutional” and therefore illegal. Until 
today, Baghdad blacklists any IOC involved in the KRG from competing for contracts in the rest 
of the country.  
 
The implications of this impasse for the oil and gas industry have been significant. Until recently 
(see below), the KRG has been virtually unable to export production that has come on line since 
the contracts were awarded; Baghdad has for the most part denied the KRG the ability to use 
federal infrastructure  for export. The blacklisting of companies operating in Iraqi Kurdistan  
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forced the KRG to turn to very small companies, some of which probably do not have adequate 
technology to do the work required. Finally, the impasse over the oil and gas laws has, as 
mentioned above, created uncertainty in the minds of international investors, who are already 
assuming significant risk by investing in Iraq.  
 
After many years of no progress on these issues, several factors have pushed them to the fore 
once again. First, as a precondition to supporting Maliki to be the prime minister in the current 
government, the Kurds reportedly extracted promises that disagreements over oil and gas issues 
would be resolved in 2011. Second, and perhaps more compelling, is that the interests of 
Baghdad and the KRG are now aligned. Baghdad needs to export more oil to fund its $83 billion 
2011 budget, but infrastructure difficulties cap significant export increases from the south in the 
short run.
21
 
  The KRG, which had curtailed production due to lack of export options, is eager to 
ramp up, demonstrate its ability to export, and bring in funds to pay IOCs that have been 
working in the region.  
These two impetuses have in fact led to some notable progress in recent months. For the first 
time since 2007, Iraqi politicians have resumed in earnest efforts to resolve the legislative 
impasse. As noted above, the new parliamentary chairman is using the mechanisms open to him 
to infuse urgency into the system; the cabinet has also reexamined legislative drafts and intends 
to submit them to Parliament. More tangibly, a deal struck between Prime Minister Maliki and 
Barham Salih, the prime minister of Kurdistan, opened the door for the export of Kurdish oil 
through federal infrastructure beginning in spring 2011. Companies in Kurdistan have resumed 
production, reaching more than 180,000 b/d by mid-2011. Even more significant than the export 
of Kurdish oil was the May 2011 payment made by the federal government to the KRG to repay 
the costs of companies paying Kurdish oil. Although questions remain over who will pay the 
“profit oil” the international companies are entitled to according to the contracts they signed 
with the KRG, the payment of costs was a breakthrough event. 
 
While this positive momentum is encouraging, the tougher issue to resolve will be the 
reconciliation of contracts between Baghdad and the KRG. Recent statements by Prime Minister 
Maliki and Oil Minister Luaibi already suggest a possible rationale for reconciliation: the more 
generous production-sharing agreements were warranted in Iraqi Kurdistan because the geology 
was more challenging and the contracts were for exploration, not brownfields. Nevertheless, one 
should not underestimate the high stakes surrounding the resolution of this issue. It has not only 
become an issue of personal pride for some in the government, but it will inevitably set an 
important precedent for the future development of Iraqi fields, possibly even by new regions and 
existing provinces. 
  
                                                 
21 The 2011 Iraqi budget explicitly stipulated that 100,000 b/d of exports should originate from the KRG.  
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Provincial activism is perhaps the greatest unappreciated challenge to efforts to construct and 
consolidate post-Saddam Iraq today. The execution of actual and perceived powers by provincial 
governments outside the framework of a widely accepted arrangement with Baghdad about the 
sharing of revenues could undermine the basis of the state. While such concerns have existed in 
theory for years, developments within the last nine months have made them real and urgent. 
Growing Interest in Provincial Empowerment and Federalism 
 
Much of the current dilemma stems from the ambiguous attitude toward federalism at the time 
of the drafting of the constitution. The Kurds insisted on a federal state as somewhat of a 
precondition for their participation in the new Iraq. As mentioned above, few others in Iraq were 
eager to embrace federalism more broadly at the time. The drafters of Iraq’s constitution, rather 
than creating a system of asymmetric federalism, included provisions in the document that 
would allow Iraq’s other (non-KRG) provinces to assume more powers and even the status of a 
federal region over time.  
 
Since 2003, both the Iraqi central government and the United States have invested in the 
development of provincial governments. Provincial councils were established for the first time 
during the 2003-2004 occupation; elections to these entities occurred alongside national ones in 
2005. A prominent focus of U.S. assistance has been to build up the capacity of these provincial 
governments in order to make them better able to respond to the demands of those who elected 
them. More recently, the central Iraqi government granted provincial governments one dollar of 
revenue for every barrel of oil produced in their territories.  
 
The growing capacity of these provincial entities—combined  with disillusionment over the 
ability of Baghdad to meet local needs—is leading many provincial authorities to extend the 
limits of their authorities. An added impetus is the example of the Kurdistan Regional 
Government; many provincial authorities have visited the KRG and been struck by the 
comparatively advanced levels of development, investment, and infrastructure there. Most return 
asking whether a more vigorous exertion of provincial powers—even along the lines exercised by 
the KRG—could bring greater benefits to their own areas.  
 
This provincial empowerment is most problematic in the realm of oil and gas, in large part 
because of many ambiguities in the constitution and law and because of the lack of an agreed 
framework on the sharing of revenues. What is clear is that the federal government is not the sole 
actor in the development of Iraq’s resources; the constitution explicitly—although somewhat 
vaguely—mandates consultation between the federal government and the regions and provinces 
in the setting of energy strategy and development. Many Iraqis read these documents as 
promising provinces the same authorities exercised by the regions (i.e., the KRG).  
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Given these impulses and ambiguities, it is not surprising that provincial authorities have already 
begun to influence the environment for Iraq’s energy development outside of Kurdistan, namely 
in various provinces in the South and West. The assertion of power and rights by provincial 
entities has begun to create obstacles to granting contracts to IOCs.  Most notable was the 
difficulty surrounding the contract awarded in the third bid round to Kogas and KaMunaiGaz 
for the Akkas field in Anbar. The provincial governor and the provincial council resisted the 
inclusion of Akkas in the third bid round and subsequently created serious obstacles to the 
contract being signed. The Anbaris’ largest objection to the contract had to do with the export of 
gas originating in Anbar at a time when Anbar desperately needs gas for electricity and 
industrialization.
22
 
  Multiple meetings between the IOCs, the Ministry of Oil, and provincial 
officials were required to resolve the impasse before finalizing the contract in June 2011, almost 
nine months after its award. Although there is no clarity over whether provincial entities can 
technically veto a contract, the noncooperation of the provincial government would be a serious 
obstacle in the contract’s execution.  
The tussles with the Kogas contract in Anbar appear to be the beginning—not the end—of such 
disputes. Although no other contracts have been delayed, a new trend is the pursuit of contracts 
to be signed exclusively between the provincial governments and foreign companies to explore 
and develop resources within a province. Many provincial entities suspect that Baghdad will 
remain focused on the large fields, primarily in the South, and their own resources will not 
receive adequate attention for years to come. Such developments add much greater urgency to 
efforts to devise and agree upon legislation for the overall development of Iraq’s resources. The 
legislation regarding the sharing of revenues and the creation of structures to formalize the 
coordination between the central government, the region(s), and the provinces is more critical 
than ever. Whereas the lack of agreement on these issues has created constant friction between 
Baghdad and the KRG, the stakes today are even higher. As recent developments outside the 
KRG make clear, a continued failure to create a widely accepted framework threatens to derail 
Iraq’s ability to craft and execute a national energy strategy. Even more seriously, this failure 
could, over time, staunch the flow of resources to the central government and therefore its ability 
to maintain the basic functions of a state, such as a national military. 
 
Regional Dynamics 
Iraq’s regional relationships will also have a bearing on the country’s ability to fully develop its 
energy resources. Although significant progress has been made in integrating Iraq back into the 
                                                 
22 To appreciate the perspective of Anbari officials, see the interview with Anbar Governor Qasim Abid in Ben 
Lando, “Anbar’s Power Play,” Iraq Oil Report (online at www.iraqoilreport.com), June 1, 2010. Also see Ben 
Lando, “Sunni Nationalism Eyes Autonomy,” Iraq Oil Report (online at www.iraqoilreport.com), November 8. 
2010.  
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region, Iraq’s relationships with many of its neighbors remain tense.
23
 
  While a variety of 
historical, cultural, and political factors explain these tensions, economic issues, particularly 
those related to energy, will increasingly shape Iraq’s external affairs. 
One need not look far to see how Iraq’s ability to manage its regional relationships affects its 
energy prospects. Perhaps of most immediate consequence is Iraq’s ability to gain sufficient 
export routes for its oil. Iraq is making strides in increasing oil production in accordance with the 
contracts signed with IOCs in 2009 and 2010, but is running up against limited options for 
exporting these higher volumes. Although ambitious plans are under way to create more export 
facilities, Iraq will need all the export routes it can develop if it dramatically increases production 
as planned and wishes to monetize this production. Reopening now-defunct pipelines through 
Syria and even Saudi Arabia will create important alternate avenues for export.
24
 
  Kuwait could 
create difficulties for Iraqi efforts to expand port facilities in Basra; Kuwait has started 
construction of a new $1.1 billion port on Bubyan Island; it has been seen by Iraq as an 
intentional effort to compete with and block access to its planned Fao Port. Maintaining good 
relations with Turkey—and refurbishing the existing pipeline between the two countries—will 
also be essential to the smooth flow of Iraqi exports.  
Iraq’s efforts to expand its energy footprint could also run into problems in the region if 
countries, or other entities, decide to seize Iraqi oil as a means of addressing outstanding debts by 
the Iraqi government. Since 2003, a combination of an American executive order and U.N. 
resolutions protected Iraqi assets from attachment; concomitant efforts to obtain debt relief for 
Iraq were extremely successful. The U.N. protection expired in mid-2011, technically opening 
Iraq to such challenges. While a number of countries conceivably could seek to take advantage of 
this lapse, Kuwait is the most likely one to do so. Although the exact number is disputed between 
Iraq and Kuwait, Baghdad still owes Kuwait tens of billions of dollars in reparations for its 1991 
invasion. Iraq, in fact, continues to provide Kuwait with 5 percent of its oil revenues to gradually 
meet these obligations. In the absence of a broader agreement between Iraq and Kuwait, Kuwait 
may seek to seize Iraqi oil as payments for the reparations.
25
 
 
Finally, regional actors could seek to slow Iraq’s growth in production, perceiving it to be a 
challenge to their own regional position, global status, and economic health. Iran and Iraq have 
long been “paired” in OPEC as having comparable reserve bases and production capacities; both 
held essentially the same quota during the years running up to the 1991 Gulf War. (Iraq has not 
                                                 
23 Most recently, Iraq has been selected to host the next Arab League summit, although that meeting was postponed 
from May 2011 until a later date in 2012.  
24 While there are currently no talks about reopening the Saudi pipeline, the Syrian and Iraqi governments are in 
open discussions about reopening the pipeline to Syria. 
25 There are still many outstanding issues to be resolved between Iraq and Kuwait, including land and sea borders, 
mechanisms for developing oil fields straddling the border, and the extent of reparations still required.  
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been subject to a quota since that time.)  In recent years, Iraq has made clear that it sees Saudi 
Arabia—not Iran—as its natural peer in the region. The 2009 and 2010 bid rounds and 
subsequent contracts—which, if fulfilled in full, would have Iraq producing more oil than Saudi 
Arabia—underscore that point. While Iraq may be confident of its resource base and even its 
ability to bring significant new oil to global markets, both Iran and Saudi Arabia are likely to be 
threatened by that prospect. Iran is interested in gaining and maintaining influence over Iraq’s 
energy strategy and in integrating the energy infrastructure of both countries; it does not want to 
see Iraq as the dominant producer in such a partnership. Saudi Arabia’s interests are even more 
vital, given that its international clout is largely tied to its position as the sole swing producer in 
OPEC. Were Iraq to decide to develop and maintain spare capacity—a policy issue on which 
there is currently no consensus in Baghdad—it could seriously undermine Saudi Arabia’s ability 
to play this strategic role. Moreover, particularly in wake of the Arab Spring, both Iran and Saudi 
Arabia are nervous about any developments that could dramatically force down the price of oil 
and, therefore, their overall revenues. If Iraq were to bring large quantities of additional oil on 
line in an uncoordinated fashion, the price of oil could well tumble. It is almost inevitable that 
such issues will affect regional dynamics in the years ahead. What is as yet undetermined is the 
regional environment in which they will be tackled. If the relationship between Baghdad and 
Riyadh in particular is not improved in the interim, the prospect for smooth resolution of these 
challenges is dim.  
 
III. Prescriptions and Conclusions  
 
The ability of Iraq to reach its energy potential and bring significant quantities of oil and gas to 
international markets in the coming years is truly a strategic issue not only for Iraq, but also for 
the United States, Japan, and the international community. While many focus on the very real 
operational and logistical challenges to Iraq’s development, political factors will be just as 
important in determining Iraq’s energy future. The stability of the government and the regime, 
the power sharing mechanisms created to ensure the buy-in of Iraq’s communities, the continued 
hum of resource nationalism, constitutional ambiguities about Iraq’s federal nature, and the 
quality of Iraq’s regional relationships will all come into play. These political factors will strongly 
influence Iraq’s ability to develop itself in the broadest sense, to play a constructive role in the 
region, and help the world meet growing energy demand at reasonable prices.  
 
The agenda for resolving these political issues is daunting. It is both complex and urgent. Many 
of these political issues—particularly ambiguities and disagreements surrounding the relative 
powers of the central government, the KRG, and the provinces in developing energy resources— 
have festered for a long time. But a continued failure to resolve them holds increasing risks for 
Iraq as a whole. Every week that goes by in which the political issues discussed are not addressed 
adds to the opportunity costs incurred by Iraq; the country falls short of meeting its energy  
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potential. But every week of nonresolution also increases the chances that Iraq will be unable to 
resolve the issues in the optimal manner as new realities take root on the ground and in the 
region.  
 
For the most part, the onus for resolving the political issues discussed lies with Iraqis. There are, 
however, a variety of ways in which the United States and the international community can 
buttress Iraq in its efforts to address these challenges. After all, the institutions in Iraq are new 
and cannot be expected to be able to bear the burden of all nation-building challenges 
simultaneously. And in order to tackle many of the issues discussed, Iraq will need to grapple 
with big fundamental and strategic matters—such as the nature of the state and the role that Iraq 
wants to play in the region. 
 
One could identify a number of specific initiatives that the international community could take, 
to include active involvement in helping Iraq improve its relationship with its neighbors. While 
such initiatives are important, the most urgent priority at the moment is setting the U.S.-Iraq 
bilateral relationship on firm footing. Although the U.S.-Iraq bilateral relationship stretches 
beyond the workings of the Iraqi state, it is very important to the overall trajectory of Iraq and, 
therefore, to the development of Iraqi energy.  
 
The current bilateral relationship is shaped by the existence of two jointly negotiated agreements: 
the 2008 Security Agreement and the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement. The first provides 
the legal framework for the presence and conduct of U.S. troops in Iraq. It is due to expire at the 
end of 2011; in the absence of a renewal or renegotiation, all U.S. troops will need to depart Iraq 
by the coming December. Small numbers—likely in the hundreds—will be able to stay for very 
limited, noncombat missions. The Strategic Framework Agreement is much broader and 
aspirational in nature. It lays out a vision of an ongoing bilateral relationship between Iraq and 
the United States grounded in shared, nonmilitary realms. The agreement speaks of exchange 
and assistance to Iraq in scientific, cultural, diplomatic, educational, and other areas.  
 
The future of this relationship is not certain at this time. Although most objective assessments 
suggest that Iraqi forces will continue to need the assistance of U.S. forces to meet Iraq’s internal 
and external threats after the end of 2011, domestic politics in Iraq and the United States suggest 
that security agreement will expire without renewal. This sort of assessment has led the 
administration of President Barack Obama to focus its efforts in Iraq on withdrawal of the 
current contingent of 48,000 U.S. troops by the end of the year. Accompanying this withdrawal is 
an intensified effort to transfer all the functions undertaken by the U.S. military to civilian 
entities. This transfer to civilian authority is complicated by the comparatively low capabilities of 
civilian agencies and the reluctance of the U.S. Congress to fund nonmilitary expenditures in 
Iraq.  
  
  18 
The departure of U.S. troops by the end of 2011 need not necessarily mean the curtailment of the 
U.S.-Iraq bilateral relationship. To many Iraqis and Americans, the logic of a strategic 
partnership—as laid out in the Strategic Framework Agreement—is self-evident. But developing 
such a relationship will require sustained commitment and hard work, given other draws on 
American resources, Iraq fatigue in the United States, and the panoply of issues about which Iraq 
and the United States could diverge in the years ahead. 
 
The implications of the health of this bilateral relationship for Iraq’s energy development are 
more fundamental than they may seem at first glance. Iraq is likely to struggle more with security 
challenges in the absence of U.S. support—particularly in intelligence, air power, border security, 
and high-end counterterrorism operations. But the real effects of a diminishing bilateral 
relationship—in the military and nonmilitary realms—are psychological and political. Although 
there is no question that Iraqis are tired of American involvement in their country, they also fear 
complete abandonment by the United States as many of them see America as the best antidote to 
their fears. Whether one is anxious about an Iranian takeover, the rise of unbridled power by 
Baghdad, or the resurgence of the Ba’ath Party, American commitment to Iraq is seen as a 
helpful bulwark. A true divergence between the United States and Iraq—while not inevitable— 
would likely have a detrimental effect on the political stability of the system overall. 
 
Strangely, both energy and Iraq command their own space in American political discourse and in 
strategic discussions among experts and policymakers. When the two are connected, it is 
generally in the misleading context of debating whether the wars in Iraq were about American 
access to Iraqi oil. Rarely is there an appreciation of how closely the supply of energy and the 
price of energy are connected to stability in Iraq. This connection—which has to do not with 
American access to Iraqi oil specifically, but the ability of Iraq to bring more of its oil to global 
markets—should be front and center in the minds of American, Japanese, and international 
policymakers considering the variety of reasons why the world still needs to be concerned with 
Iraq’s trajectory, and should keep support for Iraq’s fledgling new institutions among its highest 
priorities. 
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